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Previous studies have found that intergenerational income persistence is rela-tively high in the United States and Britain, especially as compared to Nordiccountries. We compare the association between family income and sons’ earn-
ings in the United States (National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979), Britain (British
Cohort Study 1970), and Sweden (Population Register Data, 1965 cohort), and ﬁnd
that both income elasticities and rank-order correlations are highest in the United
States, followed by Britain, with Sweden being clearly more equal. We ask whether
differences in educational inequality and in return to qualiﬁcations can explain these
cross-country differences. Surprisingly, we ﬁnd that this is not the case, even though
returns to education are higher in the United States. Instead, the low income mobility
in the United States and Britain is almost entirely due to the part of the parent-son
association that is not mediated by educational attainment. In the United States and
especially Britain, parental income is far more important for earnings at a given level
of education than in Sweden, a result that holds also when controlling for cognitive
ability. This goes against widespread ideas of the United States as a country where
the role of ascription is limited and meritocratic stratiﬁcation prevails.
Introduction
Previous studies suggest that intergenerational inequality as measured by parent-
to-child income associations is comparatively high in the United States and
Great Britain in relation to other Western countries, especially the Nordic (e.g.,
Blanden 2013; Bratsberg et al. 2007; Corak 2012). In research on intergenera-
tional mobility, education is often held forward as a key driver of intergenera-
tional income persistence and is therefore a potential explanation of such
country differences. As Corak (2006, p. 170) puts it: “The rewards to higher-
skilled/higher-educated individuals in the labor market, and the opportunities
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for children to obtain the required skills and credentials are two important fac-
tors inﬂuencing the degree of generational mobility and the differences across
countries.” In this perspective, the US and British positions may come about
because family income is more strongly related to educational attainment there,
in combination with greater economic returns to such attainment. In support of
such view, income inequality, assumed to be important for children’s opportu-
nities, is high in these countries (OECD 2011b). Previous comparative studies
have also shown family income to exert a relatively strong inﬂuence on child
cognitive development (Bradbury et al. 2015) and subsequent school attainment
(OECD 2011a) in the United States; the latter could be driven by the high costs
for US college education, which is free in most European countries (cf. Jerrim,
Chmielewski, and Parker 2015). In addition, both the United States and Britain
are characterized by high returns to college education (OECD 2013; Jerrim and
Macmillan 2015).
We study the relationship between parental income, child education, and sub-
sequent earnings, asking to what extent intergenerational income persistence can
be accounted for by education, and whether such mediation is particularly large
in the United States and Britain, thus explaining the low income mobility there.
We contrast these countries with perhaps the “most different” case, namely
Sweden, a highly equal society, purportedly because of a relatively weak impor-
tance of the family of origin on educational attainment (Erikson and Jonsson
1996) in combination with relatively low income returns to education (OECD
2013).
We begin our empirical analysis by providing improved and more comparable
estimates of intergenerational income associations (in terms of both elasticities
and rank-order correlations), using the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth (NLSY) for the United States, the British 1970 Cohort Study (BCS), and
Swedish registry data. This is a contribution to the ﬁeld in two ways: (1) we
address the double methodological problems plaguing intergenerational income
mobility studies, namely income volatility on the parental side and life-course
bias on the child’s side; and (2) we are able to use Swedish data of whole child-
hood family incomes to illustrate the likely magnitudes of residual biases in
intergenerational associations for the United States and Britain.
On the basis of these intergenerational associations, our main contribution is to
address the role of education for intergenerational persistence. We do this ﬁrst by
analyzing the association between family income and children’s educational
attainment across countries, and second by estimating the association between
educational credentials and income at around age 40. Third, we divide the total
associations into one path that goes via education and one that does not—in pre-
vious literature known as stratiﬁcation via “achievement” and “ascription,”
respectively (Blau and Duncan 1967). We consider the possibility that the United
States in particular may on the one hand be unequal because of strong associa-
tions involving education, but on the other exhibit a type of stratiﬁcation regime
where intergenerational advantages are passed on predominantly via achievement
rather than ascription, which would be indicated by a weak partial association
between parental income and own income, controlling for education.
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In our approach to measuring children’s achievement (or attainment), we take
three steps. First, we control for a four-category educational variable that is, we
believe, as comparable as possible given the generically different educational sys-
tems we analyze. Second, we construct more ﬁne-grained measures of educa-
tional qualiﬁcations that are nationally speciﬁc but comparable in the sense that
they represent functional equivalents in our three countries. Finally, in order to
pick up potentially unobserved educational differences, we also control for cog-
nitive ability, using measures that are not identical across countries but again,
we believe, comparable in capturing a very similar underlying construct.
The Mediating Role of Education for Intergenerational
Persistence
Education is often seen as the main driver of the association between parental
socioeconomic position, however measured, and child’s—indeed, this is main-
tained in such diverse social science traditions as Blau and Duncan’s (1967) sta-
tus attainment model, Bourdieu’s (1973) cultural capital approach, a variety of
social class mobility models (e.g., Ishida, Müller, and Ridge 1995), as well as in
the more recent literature on income mobility (Becker and Tomes 1986). This
follows the logic that education (E) is the key determinant of labor market desti-
nations (D), measured in terms of occupation or income, and that educational
attainment is empirically related to the socioeconomic origin (O), typically mea-
sured as the occupation or income of parents when the child is a teenager. These
two associations (ED and OE) rest on solid empirical ground and are present in
all studied modern societies and using a variety of measures (Card 1999; Jerrim
and Macmillan 2015 for ED and OE; OECD 2013 for ED; Shavit, Arum, and
Gamoran 2007 for OE; Shavit and Müller 1998; Treiman and Yip 1989).
While much research into social inequalities of opportunity has focused on
the OE and OD associations, respectively (Breen and Jonsson 2005), emphasis
has also been given to the part of the total association between origin and desti-
nation (OD) that is mediated by educational qualiﬁcations (OE*ED), but more
importantly perhaps the part that is not so mediated; that is, the origin-
destination association that remains after controlling for educational attainment
(OD.E). The latter is assumed to depend on “ascriptive” characteristics of the
childhood family that give unfair advantage to children of afﬂuent or high-status
families in the competition for job and income opportunities; such characteris-
tics would include a family name, social connections, wealth, cultural capital,
or sheer nepotism. Blau and Duncan (1967) famously assumed that such
inequality would dissipate over time, in a process where the US stratiﬁcation
system developed from one based on ascription to one based on achievement;
that is, one in which the impact of the family origin is almost entirely mediated
by education. Although not equal as long as the chances of attaining higher
education are unequally distributed, many people would certainly regard strat-
iﬁcation based on educational credentials—as in Bell’s (1973) “just meritoc-
racy”—as legitimate.
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The Form and Strength of Intergenerational Persistence
The question of whether intergenerational mobility (or persistence) is more
related to achievement than ascription is a question about the form of stratiﬁca-
tion. But often the critical question for inequality instead concerns the strength
of the intergenerational associations. In sociology, the dominant traditions have
been to study intergenerational processes via social class mobility and through
socio-economic or occupational prestige correlations across generations. Such
studies suggest that the United States and Britain, despite being economically
unequal societies, show mobility rates on par with many other Western coun-
tries (e.g., Beller and Hout 2006; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1985, 1992; Treiman
and Yip 1989). Valuable as these studies are, they suffer from two problems.
First, there is a lack of comparability across countries in occupational codes, cru-
cial for the construction of social class and gradational measures. Second, treat-
ing the social structure as comprised by a few (normally 3–10) big classes hides
a lot of variance in (“hierarchical”) living conditions and limits the opportunity
of analyzing intergenerational inequality to the full—the same problem,
although to a less extent, goes for analyses of occupational mobility.1
An indication that conventional social mobility studies tend to underestimate
the degree of intergenerational inequality is that studies of parent-to-child
income associations consistently show Britain and (particularly) the United
States to be far more unequal than other comparable Western countries, espe-
cially the Nordic (Blanden 2013; Bratsberg et al. 2007; Corak 2012; Jäntti et al.
2006). It is possible that this pattern comes about because of both relatively
strong OE and ED associations involving economic resources: Recent studies
have suggested that early child inequality may be particularly rampant in the
United States (Bradbury et al. 2015; Ermisch, Jäntti, and Smeeding 2012), and
inequality of educational achievement at around age 15 is also above average
(OECD 2011a, ﬁgure 2.4). In addition, the cost for college education is relatively
high in the United States, as are the returns to educational qualiﬁcations (OECD
2013, tables A6.1, A7.3a–3b).
It is particularly in the United States, then, that we assume that education is a
strong mediator of the intergenerational income association. Unlike the United
States, Britain is not seen as a very achievement-oriented society—it is more con-
ventionally portrayed rather as a “class society,” especially in a transatlantic
perspective, and thus possibly closer to the ascriptive form of stratiﬁcation. In
our empirical analysis, we ask to what extent educational credentials are behind
the intergenerational income associations—if this is the case, it would point to
educational policy as the potentially most important remedy for inequality of
opportunity. We contrast the high-inequality countries of the United States and
Britain with Sweden, a country clearly toward the equal end of the distribution
of income (OECD 2011b) and with low intergenerational persistence (e.g.,
Blanden 2013). Is the position Sweden takes due to weak OE and ED associa-
tions, or could it be that, as a generally equal society, also its ascriptive features
are weak?
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Estimating Income Mobility
Studies of fathers and sons dominate the research on intergenerational mobility,
which is becoming increasingly untenable with growing female labor participa-
tion. Ignoring mothers is particularly problematic given that father’s income or
occupation gives only partial information about the economic (and related) re-
sources that a child can draw upon, something that can give a biased image of
the extent and patterns of persistence (Beller 2009; Nordli Hansen 2010). In
contrast to much of the previous work on intergenerational mobility, we there-
fore include not only fathers’ but also mothers’ incomes to calculate total family
income. On the child side, we have, however, reluctantly chosen to study sons
only, for two reasons. First, the analyses of daughters require modeling the com-
plex cross-country differences in the patterns of female labor market participa-
tion, which warrants a careful and thorough treatment and therefore an article
of its own. Second, we do not have data on cognitive ability for Swedish women,
as this information was gathered through the military conscription tests.
Our ﬁrst estimate of income mobility is the regression coefﬁcient β from
equation (1),
α β ε= + + ( )Y Yln ln , 1i i i1Child 1 Parent
where i indexes individuals (children), the dependent variable is the log of earn-
ings (Yi Child) of an individual in adulthood and the explanatory variable is the
log of income of the parents during childhood (Yi Parent), ɛ1 is an idiosyncratic
error term, and α1 and β are parameters to be estimated. Our parameter of inter-
est, β, is the intergenerational elasticity, interpreted as the proportion of the
income differences between two sets of parents that we on average will ﬁnd in
(and assessed at the geometric mean of) children’s earnings.
The elasticity measures the relationship between two generations’ incomes
often decades apart, and is sensitive to changes in these distributions; the elastic-
ity becomes higher, ceteris paribus, if the variance increases from parents to chil-
dren, and vice versa. It is therefore useful to calculate the rank-order correlation
(Spearman’s rho) to analyze whether there is also an inter-nation difference in
positional mobility. This measure removes differences in income dispersion
across generations and countries by focusing solely on the role of changing posi-
tions within the income distributions (see Chetty et al. 2014; Gregg, Macmillan,
and Vittori 2016), and is often preferred to the Pearson correlation (which ad-
justs the elasticity by dividing the standard deviation in log family income with
the standard deviation of son’s log earnings, but is more sensitive to distribu-
tional properties such as extreme values).2 Measuring both the elasticity and the
rank correlation therefore allows us to assess the economic consequences of the
intergenerational income process (elasticities) for our samples, as well as the
positional mobility in the underlying distribution (the rank correlation).
We calculate the rank correlation, using percentile groups, as
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α β ε= + + ( )Y Yrank rank , 2i r i i2Child 2 Parent
which is the same as equation (1) apart from using the percentile rank transfor-
mations of the parental income and child’s earnings variables. Here, ɛi2 is the idi-
osyncratic error term and α2 and β
r are the parameters to be estimated, where βr
now gives the rank correlation between incomes across generations.
A concern in income mobility studies is measurement error. First, a point-in-
time measure includes temporary income ﬂuctuations (“transitory shocks”),
biasing mobility estimates downward, which is why averaging across a number
of periods of income is to be preferred (Solon 1992). To address this, we concen-
trate on analyses based on two points of family income—for Sweden, we can
even estimate full childhood family incomes, which we use for adjusting US and
British income mobility estimates. Second, the age at which earnings are mea-
sured affects estimates: Age-earnings proﬁles are steeper for individuals with
more human capital, making measures of earnings at younger ages downwardly
biased. Haider and Solon (2006) and Böhlmark and Lindquist (2006) show how
the estimated lifetime income is affected by using single-year earnings as proxies,
and suggest that earnings measures around age 40 are good approximations in
both the United States and Sweden. We have therefore chosen to show results
using child’s earnings at around that age (for results for younger and older ages,
see Gregg et al. 2013).
Estimating the Role of Education
To estimate the role of education for intergenerational persistence, we follow the
common practice in the intergenerational literature (e.g., Blanden, Gregg, and
Macmillan 2007; Bowles, Gintis, and Osborn Groves 2005) and use the intuitive
decomposition approach traditionally used in path analysis. The ﬁrst stage in-
volves analyzing the relation between the education of an individual and the
parental income, as shown in equation (3):
α λ ε= + + ( )ed Yln , 3i i i3Child 3 Parent
where i indexes individuals (children), edi Child is the child’s measured education
and Yi Parent is parental income in childhood, ɛi3 is an idiosyncratic error term,
and λ and α3 are parameters to be estimated. λ is therefore the estimated associa-
tion between parental income and child’s education level.
The second stage involves analyzing the labor market value of education in
terms of later earnings, conditional on parental income, as shown in
equation (4):
α γ δ= + + + ( )Y ed Y uln ln , 4i i i iChild Child Parent
where the log of child earnings in adulthood (Yi Child) are regressed on the educa-
tion level of the child (edChild) and the log of parental childhood income
(YParent), u is an error term and α, γ, and δ are parameters to be estimated, with γ
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capturing the returns to given education levels and δ measuring the direct associ-
ation between parental income in childhood and the child’s labor market earn-
ings, conditional on their educational attainment. By combining equations (3)
and (4), the elasticity in equation (1), β, can be decomposed into two parts. First,
the “direct income component,” δ, and second, the “through education compo-
nent,” which is the product of the relationship between education and family
income (λ) and the returns to education in the labor market (γ), meaning that the
elasticity can be written as
β γλ δ= + ( ). 5
The logic is the same for the decomposition of rank correlations. In essence,
the decomposition consists in comparing the effect terms for parental income
before (β) and after (δ) adding child education to the regression, with the differ-
ence between these two being the part accounted for by education (γλ). One
should keep in mind that it is a descriptive and not a causal decomposition, as
observed associations may also pick up effects of unmeasured factors. However,
this is a problem for our cross-country comparisons only insofar as there are dif-
ferences across countries in the impact of unobserved variables.
Data and Measures
Because of the measurement problems mentioned above, very few datasets are
suitable for studies of intergenerational income mobility. In fact, we have found
only one dataset in the United States (NLSY; cf. Levine and Mazumder 2002)
and one in England (BCS; cf. Blanden, Gregg, and Macmillan 2007) that (1) pro-
vide information on income/earnings at two or more occasions directly from
both parents and children; (2) measure child earnings around age 40; and (3)
cover approximately the same birth cohorts.3 The Swedish register data (e.g.,
Mood, Jonsson, and Bihagen 2012) are more ﬂexible, and we adjust them to
match the structure of the other datasets.
The NLSY is a nationally representative survey of around 13,000 individuals
born in the United States between January 1, 1957, and December 21, 1964,
that is, aged 14–22 in 1979. They were followed yearly up until 1994 and bian-
nually since. The original sample consists of three subsamples; we use the cross-
section sample of 2,974 boys designed to be nationally representative of all non-
institutionalized civilians living in the United States in 1979 in these age groups,
using custom-designed sampling weights to control for the complex nature of
the survey. The BCS sampled all those born in Britain in a particular week in
April 1970, in total 8,906 baby boys, and obtained data on sample members
and their families at birth and at various ages, of which we use 10 and 16 for ori-
gin information and 42 for generating son’s income.
The Swedish data come from population-wide registers, primarily tax records,
educational registers, censuses, and the enlistment register (for cognitive ability).
Information from different registers is matched (also longitudinally) using a un-
ique personal identiﬁer, and information for parents and children is matched
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using a multigenerational link.4 We here use the full male cohort born 1965,
around 50,000 parent-son pairs, with matched information on parental incomes
during childhood and own earnings when adult.
Income and Earnings Measures
The NLSY provides a continuous measure of the resident parents’ total family
income, counting income from all sources, before any taxes or deductions both
in 1978 and 1979, when cohort members were on average age 16 and 17.
Cohort members must have family income in both periods to be included in our
ﬁnal sample. We use sons’ earnings as measured in 2000 when the average age
of the cohort members was 39. Cohort dummies are included throughout the
analysis in the United States to account for the fact that respondents were born
across an eight-year period.
The British BCS contains income of the parents present in the household
before taxes and deductions in banded form at age 10 and 16. We generate con-
tinuous income variables by ﬁtting a Singh–Maddala (1976) distribution to the
banded data using maximum likelihood estimation, which is particularly helpful
in allocating an expected value for those in the open top category. These mea-
sures have been extensively used and their robustness and comparability care-
fully tested (see Blanden, Gregg, and Macmillan 2013, appendix A, for full
details, including the speciﬁc survey questions asked). Cohort members must
have reported incomes at 10 and 16 to be included in our ﬁnal sample. We use
earnings information for sons in the British data at age 42, using work history
data to take into account spells out of work in the last year.
For Sweden, income data for parents are available from 1968 onward, and
earnings data are available for children from 1990 to 2007. For the 1965 cohort,
we have parental incomes (here deﬁned as incomes of parent and any stepparent
in the household of residence) for sons’ ages 3–18 and sons’ earnings for ages
25–42. Because we can construct average family income from two different peri-
ods for the NLSY (age 16 and 17) and BCS (age 10 and 16), we use income mea-
sured at child ages 10, 16, and 17 in the Swedish data to match either of these.
We also use the Swedish data to explore the likely extent of attenuation bias
from observing parental income across the entire childhood compared to two
points in time in the US and British survey data. In our calculation of elasticities,
we ﬁnd that measures of family income at age 16 and 17 capture 71 percent of
the persistence from total childhood income estimates, and at 10 and 16, around
81 percent of the total persistence from observing total childhood income. This
difference across measures from the US and British data is to be expected, given
that there is likely to be more transitory error in the US data with incomes
measured only one year apart, compared to six years in the British data. If
uncorrected, this would lead to an artiﬁcially low persistence in British data, so
we therefore rescale the three country estimates to be comparable (see below).
A requirement to be included in the Swedish data is that at least one parent lives
in Sweden at ages 10, 16, or 17, and has any registered income, and hence immi-
grant children who arrived after around age 10 are excluded from the analysis.
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Out of all men born in 1965 with at least one parent living in Sweden, 9 percent
lack information on parental income, and two-thirds of this group has immigrant
parents. We also exclude zero incomes (0.5 percent), as families with children in
Sweden cannot have true zero disposable incomes. Child earnings are measured at
age 41. All income and earnings data are annual, measured per calendar year, and
top-coded at four standard deviations from the mean in order to down-weight the
impact of a small group with extremely high values (inevitable in population data).
In all countries, we exclude individuals with missing data on earnings, and
self-employed earnings (the latter of which are usually poor indicators of true
economic status). A ﬁnal reﬁnement to improve comparability is to adjust the
lower tail of the son’s earnings distribution, as the British data, unlike the US
and Swedish, exclude those who do not work at the time of the survey. Also, to
bring the samples in the United States and Sweden more in line with the British
data, we trim the tail of the annual earnings in the United States and Sweden
below the 2nd percentile of earnings.5
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for family income and sons’ earnings
across countries and age groups, as well as sons’ highest educational attainment.
All income measures are logged and deﬂated using national consumer price indi-
ces. In all countries, family income pertains to the coupled or single-parent
household where the child lived at the time of measurement. Our average mea-
sures use the natural logarithm of the average incomes (rather than the average
of the logged incomes).
The greatest problem with studying intergenerational income associations is
that it requires income data for parents (reported by parents when their children
live at home) as well as earnings for children as adults (reported by children).
The few data sources that manage this are panel surveys that typically come
with high non-response rates, much due to attrition. In the US data, there is fam-
ily income at age 16 for 2,150 out of 2,974 boys, which is reduced to 1,562
when demanding a second data point on family income (at age 17) and, mostly
because of panel attrition up to the age of measuring earnings at age 39 (but also
because we removed 7 percent self-employed), we are left with 985 cases for our
analytical sample. The British panel attrition reduces the 8,906 originally sam-
pled boys to 3,554 at age 16 (recall that this is a very long panel), which is fur-
ther reduced to 2,757 when adding a second data point for family income, and
1,332 for the ﬁnal sample (removing self-employed and those who did not
respond at age 42 or had missing data on earnings).
With the missingness in the US and British (but not Swedish) data, we run the
risk that our analytical samples misrepresent the original samples. We checked
this by comparing means and associations between the original sample and our
analytical sample. In the US data, respondents’ educational distribution and
mean earnings, as well as family income at either age of the child, are compara-
ble. In the British data, the panel attrition is somewhat greater for children of
lower education and lower cognitive ability. However, correlations between our
main variables are reassuringly similar, and our decomposition analysis returns
very similar estimates when we use one rather than two observations of family
income (while the elasticities show the advantage of using two).
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Measures of Educational Attainment and Cognitive Ability
Sons’ education is measured around age 26–28 in the United States and Britain,
and in Sweden it is derived from the population educational register of 2007 (or
earlier if the individual is missing in 2007). We ﬁrst construct a four-category
highest educational attainment measure aiming at maximum comparability, as
depicted in the lower part of table 1 (shown as ISCED categories in appendix
Table 1. Summary Statistics of Family Income, Earnings, and Education in the United States,
Britain, and Sweden for Our Sample of Parent-Son Pairs
Country US Britain Sweden
Birth cohort 1957–65 1970 1965
Average ln monthly income (st. dev.)
Family income age 16 10.78 (0.67) 9.85 (0.60) 12.58 (0.47)
Average family income 16, 17 10.84 (0.59) 12.59 (0.45)
Average family income 10, 16 9.88 (0.44) 12.57 (0.41)
Earnings at 39/42 10.59 (0.69) 10.40 (0.59) 12.48 (0.54)
Highest educational level of son in US/
Britain/Sweden
Percent
Dropout/<O-level/comprehensive 7.2 19.2 14.9







Missing education data 5.8 9.0 0.1
Total 100 100 100
N 985 1,332 49,482
Notes:
1. Sources: Authors’ calculations based on NLSY79 (United States), BCS70 (Britain), and
Swedish population registers, 1965 cohort. Sample weights are used in the United States for
the representative cross-sectional sample.
2. Across all three sources, the sample consists of those with valid observation of parental
income at two periods in childhood (16/17 United States, 10/16 Britain/Sweden) and earnings
at age 39/42.
3. For Sweden, education is the highest education recorded 1990–2007. In the United States
and Britain, education is the highest education recorded in 1988 and 1996, respectively.
4. Excluded from the sample are observations with self-employed sons or zero parental
incomes, sons in the bottom 2 percent of earnings (United States and Sweden), and sons in
the top 2 percent of earnings (United States).
5. Incomes and earnings above 4 standard deviations are top-coded in Sweden.
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table A1). The bottom category consists of those, normally low achievers, who
left school early without a qualiﬁcation (although in Sweden they formally have
the lowest type of exam). The next level consists of those who graduated and
thus can call on some qualiﬁcations—in Sweden this amounts to shorter voca-
tional tracks at the secondary level. While we believe that the British level is
equivalent to the US here, we should note that Britons at this level are 16 years
of age rather than 18/19 in the United States and Sweden. The highest level sin-
gles out those with a university exam, such as a bachelor’s degree, and the cate-
gory in between then consists of all other types of upper secondary and shorter
postsecondary educational qualiﬁcations, general or vocational. Dummies are
included in regressions where education information is missing (6 percent in US
data and 9 percent in Britain, less than 0.1 percent in Sweden).
Second, we construct a much more detailed classiﬁcation (appendix table A2).
This is nationally speciﬁc but indirectly comparable because it covers the impor-
tant distinctions in each nation’s educational system, and incorporates function-
ally equivalent qualiﬁcations and degrees. Because the British educational system
is more qualiﬁcation based than either the US or Swedish, we include number of
O- and A-levels as a separate category. In all countries alike, we were able to dis-
tinguish between university majors with different labor market returns.
Third, we also include a measure of cognitive ability to complement the indica-
tors of formal educational qualiﬁcations. The NLSY contains a standardized mea-
sure of the Armed Forces Qualiﬁcation Test (AFQT) taken at age 17. This is a
combined score from arithmetic reasoning, word knowledge, paragraph compre-
hension, and numerical operations. For the British data, we create a combined test
score at age 16 including tests for spelling, vocabulary, reading, and math. (When
missing, this score was complemented with standardized reading, spelling, lan-
guage comprehension, math, and ability [words, numbers, matrices] test scores
measured at age 10.) For Sweden, we use a standardized measure of the enlistment
test, combining logical reasoning, verbal comprehension, spatial ability, and tech-
nical understanding, and taken by almost all men in our cohorts at age 18.6
Results
We begin with the country ranking of intergenerational income associations.
Table 2 shows income elasticities and rank correlations for our countries, using
family income at child’s age 16 (left side) as well as estimates averaging family
income over two or more observations (right side).
First, associations are stronger the more data points on family income we use.
Second, there is a clear ranking of mobility across the countries when using com-
parable measures of (point-in-time) family income at 16 and earnings at around
40, with Sweden exhibiting far greater mobility, Britain in the middle, and the
United States with the lowest mobility. Third, the alternative rank correlation
measure, which adjusts for changes in income inequality across generations, re-
veals the same patterns across countries. This is an important and novel ﬁnding,
suggesting that the lower mobility in the United States is not, as could be
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Table 2. Intergenerational Elasticities and Rank Correlations at Age 39/42 for Sons in the US, Britain, and Sweden
Country US Britain Sweden US Sweden Britain Sweden Sweden
Point-in-time family income Averaging family income over child’s ages
Age family income 16 16 16 16 & 17 16 & 17 10 & 16 10 & 16 3–18
Elasticity 0.372 0.315 0.213 0.427 0.236 0.453 0.268 0.332
(0.028) (0.023) (0.005) (0.038) (0.005) (0.035) (0.006) (0.007)
Rank 0.354 0.343 0.225 0.350 0.231 0.343 0.240 0.255
(0.027) (0.023) (0.004) (0.032) (0.004) (0.026) (0.004) (0.005)
N 1,320 1,662 50,428 985 49,951 1,332 49,482 38,540
Notes:
1. Sources: Authors’ calculations based on NLSY79 (United States), BCS70 (Britain), and Swedish population registers, 1965 cohort. Sample weights are
used in the United States for the representative cross-sectional sample.
2. Elasticities and rank coefﬁcients from regressions of ln of sons’ gross annual earnings/rank of ln earnings on ln of family income/rank of ln income.
Standard errors in parentheses.
3. Across all three sources, the sample consists of those with valid observation of parental income at two periods in childhood (16/17 United States, 10/
16 Britain/Sweden) and earnings at age 39/42.
4. For Sweden, education is the highest education recorded 1990–2007. In the United States and Britain, education is the highest education recorded in
1988 and 1996, respectively.
5. Excluded from the sample are observations with self-employed sons or zero parental incomes, sons in the bottom 2 percent of earnings (United
States and Sweden), and sons in the top 2 percent of earnings (United States).





by University College London Library user
on 10 January 2018
surmised, because of a particularly rapid growth in income inequality across
generations. To test the robustness of our ﬁndings, we calculated rank correla-
tions averaging across two observations also on the son’s side; this exercise did
not change the correlations much (results not shown).
Fourth, when correcting for some of the temporary ﬂuctuations in family
income (or reporting errors in the data) by averaging family incomes over two
years, the ordering of Britain and the United States is not so clear. The elasticity
is now slightly higher in Britain, but this is an unfair comparison because with
two data points observed six years apart, there is likely to be less persistence in
transitory shocks, giving a better proxy for permanent childhood income.
Utilizing the ﬂexibility of the Swedish data, we can explore how much of a dif-
ference averaging over these different windows makes. If we use the point-in-
time family income elasticity at age 16 (0.213), averaging over age 16 and 17, as
is available in the US data, produces an 11 percent increase, to 0.236. In the
United States, the coefﬁcient increases by 15 percent, from 0.372 to 0.427.
Taking an average of income at age 10 and 16 in the Swedish data, as is avail-
able in the British data, produces an increase in the estimated persistence from
0.213 to 0.268 (26 percent increase). The corresponding increase in the British
data is from 0.307 to 0.444 (45 percent increase). Overall, this suggests that
averaging over adjacent years removes less bias in elasticities than averaging
over years further apart, which means that the true British elasticity is probably
not higher than the US one. We can also see that the impact of averaging on elas-
ticities is greater in Britain and the United States as compared to Sweden, which
is probably due to measurement error being greater in survey data. All in all,
elasticities are sensitive to measurement error, while rank correlations are quite
well estimated by the point-in-time coefﬁcients (cf. Chetty et al. 2014 for the
United States).
Adjusting Elasticities Using Whole Childhood Income Histories
Because of the sizeable increases in elasticities when family incomes are summed
over two observations, it is pertinent to ask what estimates would look like if we
had even more observations. Fortunately, we have the unique opportunity to
calculate the average family incomes over virtually the whole childhood (age
3–18) in the Swedish data. This leads to a substantial increase in intergenera-
tional persistence, the elasticity going from the point estimate 0.213 at age 16,
over the 10/16 average of 0.268, to 0.332 (see the rightmost column in table 2).
The rank correlation is again much more resistant to measurement error,
increasing from 0.225 (0.240) to 0.255.
Because the US estimates (using ages 16/17) are more downwardly biased
than the British estimates (using ages 10/16), we adjust the estimates in order to
be able to compare them, and for this purpose we use the scaling suggested by
the Swedish data. Naturally, measurement error may not be identical over coun-
tries, but for comparative purposes this rescaling is clearly better than compar-
ing the 10/16 to the 16/17 estimates without any adjustment. We thus assume
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that the attenuation bias we found for Sweden would be proportionally the
same for our other countries, and we rescale all estimates to the Swedish 3–18
estimates. That is, we assume that the elasticity when observing family income at
age 16 and 17 captures only around 71 percent, and at 10 and 16 around 81
percent of the elasticity when observing whole childhood family income.7 This
adjustment moves the elasticity for total childhood income in Britain to around
0.55 and for the United States up in the region of 0.60, matching the estimate in
Mazumder (2005). This is thus our expected elasticity for the United States and
Britain if we had had income data for whole childhoods. If the US and British
data contain more measurement error than the Swedish data, these numbers
underestimate the true elasticity in these countries.
Because the attenuation bias in the rank correlation is much smaller, the same
rescaling makes less of a difference, and the ranking of countries is the same,
from low persistence in Sweden (rrank = 0.255) to high persistence in Britain
(0.354) and, especially, the United States (0.386).8 Figure 1 reports the results
for the rescaling of both elasticities and rank correlations, and demonstrates that
the differences between countries are similar irrespective of measure. Our analy-
sis of the strength of the intergenerational income associations supports the con-
jecture made previously: The United States has the lowest mobility, Britain is not
far off, while Sweden is clearly the most mobile of our countries.
Educational Inequality, and Returns to Education
Building on the estimations of the strength of the intergenerational persistence
above, we now turn to the form of the stratiﬁcation system. We do this by un-
packing the mobility process into the role that (a) education inequalities (OE)
and (b) wage returns to education (ED) play in intergenerational income persis-
tence across our countries. Can the low mobility in the United States and Britain
be explained by high levels of inequality of educational attainment, or by great
returns to educational credentials? In the following, we only show regression
tables for the ﬁrst (four-category) education variable (for results using extended
educational measures and cognitive ability variables, see appendix tables A3 and
A4).
We begin by exploring the patterns of returns to education across countries.
Table 3 describes the percentage lower earnings associated with achieving a
given level of educational attainment compared to the baseline category (univer-
sity degree/bachelor’s). There is a substantial advantage with having a university
exam in all countries, and there is a gradient also among the other educational
categories. While the income differences across educational categories are much
the same in Britain and Sweden, the United States stands out by having a partic-
ularly high return to a bachelor’s degree.
The results for the earnings returns to education appear to support the view
that education is behind the low mobility in the United States, but as we recall
from equation (5) this also depends on the relation between family income and
educational attainment, shown in table 4. The interpretation is the effect of a
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doubling of average family income on the probability of being in each one of the
education groupings rather than in any of the other three categories. There are
striking similarities in the educational inequalities between the United States and
Sweden. In contrast, British men experience more inequality, with family income
being especially important for avoiding the lowest level of education. However,
Sweden shows a relatively strong negative estimate for shorter upper secondary
schooling, which is probably a consequence of the accentuated vocational con-
tent at this level of education.
Decomposing the Intergenerational Association: The Role of Education
Can the role of education in the intergenerational process account for the low
mobility in the United States and Britain? After having analyzed both the associ-
ation between family income and education, and the returns to education, we
now turn to decomposing the income association.9 As above, we rescale the as-
sociations and its constituent parts to approximate a value that is comparable
across countries. That is, we divide all components by the same constant (0.71
Figure 1. Estimated intergenerational income elasticities and rank-rank correlations for sons




























1. Sources: Authors’ calculations based on NLSY79 (United States), BCS70 (Britain), and
Swedish population registers, 1965 cohort. Sample weights are used in the United States for
the representative cross-sectional sample.
2. Across all three sources, the sample consists of those with valid observation of parental
income at two periods in childhood (16/17 United States, 10/16 Britain/Sweden) and
earnings at age 39/42.
3. Excluded from the sample are observations with self-employed sons or zero parental
incomes, sons in the bottom 2 percent of earnings (United States and Sweden), and sons in
the top 2 percent of earnings (United States).
4. Incomes and earnings above 4 standard deviations are top-coded in Sweden.
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in the United States, 0.81 in Britain), which of course does not change the pro-
portion accounted for by education.
We follow the three-step strategy described earlier. First, we use only our
most comparable four-category educational schema; then we add the full educa-
tional classiﬁcation; ﬁnally, we add our indicators of cognitive ability (appendix
tables A3 and A4 give the underlying regressions for the two last steps). Figure 2
shows the results, with the three bars to the left representing the elasticities and
the three to the right the rank correlations. Our decomposition separates out the
part of the income associations (OD) that is mediated by education (in two
Table 3. Wage Returns to Highest Educational Level for Sons in the United States, Britain,
and Sweden
US Britain Sweden
Highest educational level of sons in
US/Britain/Sweden
Dropout/<O-level/comprehensive −0.762 (0.082) −0.563 (0.045) −0.546 (0.009)
HS graduate/O-level/short upper
secondary
−0.557 (0.050) −0.384 (0.038) −0.423 (0.007)
Assoc/A-levels/long upper sec., short
post sec.




N 985 1,332 49,482
Notes:
1. Sources: Authors’ calculations based on NLSY79 (United States), BCS70 (Britain), and
Swedish population registers, 1965 cohort. Sample weights are used in the United States for
the representative cross-sectional sample.
2. Coefﬁcients from a regression of ln monthly earnings of sons at 39/42 on highest education
level dummies for sons and ln monthly average family income in childhood. Standard errors
in parentheses.
3. A missing dummy is included for missing sons’ education (not shown in table).
4. Family income averaged over age 10 and 16 in British data; 16 and 17 in US data; 10 and 16 in
Swedish data. Using 16 and 17 for Sweden gives −0.557, −0.432, −0.259.
5. Elasticities and rank coefﬁcients from regressions of ln of sons’ gross annual earnings/rank
of ln earnings on ln of family income/rank of ln income.
6. Across all three sources, the sample consists of those with valid observation of parental
income at two periods in childhood (16/17 United States, 10/16 Britain/Sweden) and earnings
at age 39/42.
7. For Sweden, education is the highest education recorded 1990–2007. In the United States
and Britain, education is the highest education recorded in 1988 and 1996, respectively.
8. Excluded from the sample are observations with self-employed sons or zero parental
incomes, sons in the bottom 2 percent of earnings (United States and Sweden), and sons in
the top 2 percent of earnings (United States).
9. Incomes and earnings above 4 standard deviations are top-coded in Sweden.
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forms) and by cognitive ability from the “ascriptive” part that is unmediated by
these variables (OD.E). This can be seen as the bottom (black) part of the bars,
while the mediators make up the upper part (dark gray for the comparative
four-level education, white for the full educational variable, and light gray for
cognitive ability).
Surprisingly, the results reveal that the transmission of advantage across
generations—measured either as elasticities or rank correlations—which is ﬂow-
ing through education (the non-black ﬁelds) is quite similar in all three countries.
There is slightly less persistence through education in Sweden, and given the
Table 4. Family Income Gradients in Education for Sons in the United States, Britain, and
Sweden
US Britain Sweden
Highest educational level of sons in
US/Britain/Sweden
Dropout/<O-level/comprehensive −0.092 (0.015) −0.187 (0.024) −0.127 (0.004)
HS graduate/O-level/short upper
secondary
−0.118 (0.029) −0.046 (0.030) −0.207 (0.005)
Assoc/A-levels/long upper sec., short
post sec.
0.013 (0.027) 0.044 (0.020) 0.145 (0.005)
Bachelor’s/university qualiﬁcation/
univ qualiﬁc




N 985 1,332 49,482
Notes:
1. Sources: Authors’ calculations based on NLSY79 (United States), BCS70 (Britain), and
Swedish population registers, 1965 cohort. Sample weights are used in the United States for
the representative cross-sectional sample.
2. Income gradients from separate bivariate regressions of categorical education dummies on
family income in childhood. The base category is therefore all other education categories.
Coefﬁcients show the effects of doubling family incomes on attaining one educational
qualiﬁcation rather than any other. Standard errors in parentheses.
3. Family income averaged over age 10 and 16 in British data; 16 and 17 in US data; 10 and 16 in
Swedish data (using 16 and 17 for Sweden gives −0.115, −0.165, 0.127, and 0.153).
4. Across all three sources, the sample consists of those with valid observation of parental
income at two periods in childhood (16/17 United States, 10/16 Britain/Sweden) and earnings
at age 39/42.
5. For Sweden, education is the highest education recorded 1990–2007. In the United States
and Britain, education is the highest education recorded in 1988 and 1996, respectively.
6. Excluded from the sample are observations with self-employed sons or zero parental
incomes, sons in the bottom 2 percent of earnings (United States and Sweden), and sons in
the top 2 percent of earnings (United States).
7. Incomes and earnings above 4 standard deviations are top-coded in Sweden.
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patterns revealed in tables 3 and 4, we infer that this originates in the lower re-
turns to education rather than in smaller inequalities in education by parental
income. But the standout characteristic of Sweden is the unmediated part: The
net association between family income and own earnings, controlling for educa-
tion and cognitive ability, is much stronger in the United States and Britain.
Thus, education is not, as is commonly believed, the important trigger of differ-
ences in income mobility between our countries. Instead, the big differences arise
in the part of the parent-to-son income elasticity not going through education: it
is inequalities in earnings within education groups that are strikingly more pat-
terned by parental income in the United States and Britain compared to Sweden.
And although Britain appears to have somewhat more ascription than the
United States, the main picture is one that puts both of these countries in the
unequal (“class society”) stratiﬁcation type: that is, where the intergenerational
income association is strong and ascription is a prominent feature. To be sure, a
tangible income association that is unmediated by education and cognitive abil-
ity also remains in Sweden, so there are no doubt general mechanisms in
Western labor markets that favor children of high-income families. In fact, 43
percent of the intergenerational income association in Sweden is not mediated
by education, which is in itself a reminder that Bell’s meritocratic ideal is far
away from the observed patterns—but this ﬁgure is overshadowed by the 57
percent in the United States and 65 percent in Britain.
It can be noted from ﬁgure 2 that when we go from our four-category educa-
tion variable to a fuller account of education, the part that is mediated by educa-
tion increases especially in Britain, while cognitive ability plays a larger role in
the United States. It is possible that both of these pick up inequality in educa-
tional attainment that is dependent on socio-economically biased selection (on
grades or test results) to educational institutions that give high monetary return
(in the British case, this may be due to the indicators of performance in terms of
O- and A-level qualiﬁcations).
Conclusions
In asking how the strength and form of the parent-to-son income associations
differ across countries, we delve into the nuts and bolts of intergenerational
inequality. Our empirical study, using the most comparable recent data and
drawing on new and improved ways of correcting for measurement error,
strongly supports the view of the United States as a country where income
mobility is particularly low. We estimate that around 60 percent, probably
more, of the income gap among parents persists to their 40-year-old sons in the
cohorts we study. However, Britain is not far behind at 55 percent, while
Sweden predictably shows a much lower elasticity, 33 percent; a ﬁgure that still
reﬂects a tangible intergenerational persistence. These estimates are all quite
high relative to previous ﬁndings, but arrived at through the unique possibility
of estimating family income during the whole childhood in Swedish data.
Surprisingly, despite the fact that the rewards reaped by college graduates in
the United States exceed the ones in Britain and Sweden, the high income
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persistence in the United States is not primarily channeled via education. This is
partly because the association between family income and children’s education
is relatively similar across countries, but mostly because in the United States and
Britain parental income is strongly associated with son’s earnings at given levels
of attained education. Arguably, equalizing education, even reducing the returns
to higher education, would move neither the United States nor Britain to inter-
generational persistence levels close to Sweden’s.
There is a concern that this result may come about because we failed to mea-
sure education in enough detail, but controlling for national-speciﬁc, detailed
educational variables and, in addition, for cognitive ability/test results, does not
change the main story. Thus, the big difference between our countries lies in the
processes that push children of more advantaged family origins to more re-
warded jobs than their less fortunate peers with similar education and ability—
in the United States and Britain, this is much more common than in Sweden.
Thus, the optimistic view of the United States as a country that has come some
way from ascription toward achievement, famously heralded by Blau and
Figure 2. Decomposing intergenerational elasticities and rank-rank correlations for sons



























Direct Through ed, 4 Through ed, full Through IQ
Notes:
1. Sources: Authors’ calculations based on NLSY79 (United States), BCS70 (Britain), and
Swedish population registers, 1965 cohort. Sample weights are used in the United States for
the representative cross-sectional sample.
2. For Sweden, education is the highest education recorded 1990–2007. In the United States
and Britain, education is the highest education recorded in 1988 and 1996, respectively.
3. Across all three sources, the sample consists of those with valid observation of parental
income at two periods in childhood (16/17 United States, 10/16 Britain/Sweden) and
earnings at age 39/42.
4. Excluded from the sample are observations with self-employed sons or zero parental
incomes, sons in the bottom 2 percent of earnings (United States and Sweden), and sons in
the top 2 percent of earnings (United States).
5. Incomes and earnings above 4 standard deviations are top-coded in Sweden.
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Duncan (1967) and Bell (1973), is clearly challenged when studying recent
income mobility: not only is the level of income persistence high, the process
behind is—following their terminology—largely ascriptive, or non-meritocratic.
A particular advantage of our analyses is that we could verify that the inter-
nation differences in the strength and form of income persistence hold both
when using elasticities and rank correlations. Thus, changes in income inequality
across generations play a limited role for our results—in fact, they are reducing
country differences measured as elasticities because the growth in inequality was
greatest in Sweden across the generations we study, as inequality was high in the
United States and Britain already in the parent generation.
As a caveat to our results, there is as yet no survey dataset suitable for study-
ing income mobility that does not suffer from potential measurement error, par-
ticularly when it comes to panel attrition and other forms of missingness. While
our examinations of missing cases convinced us that our results would stand the
test of better data, the ﬁner details will certainly need corroboration by further
studies.
Our analyses concern earnings for men. The intergenerational association is
generally found to be lower for daughters than for sons (e.g., Chadwick and
Solon 2002), but with similar patterns across countries (Jäntti et al. 2006). It is
difﬁcult to predict whether the cross-country differences in the mediating role of
education that we observe would be similar for women, as this depends on, inter
alia, country differences in educational distributions by gender and parental
income, as well as differences in patterns of female labor participation and gen-
der wage gaps. These are complex but important issues to explore in future
research.
As mentioned, our income coefﬁcients should not be given a causal interpreta-
tion. Both the education-mediated and the “direct” part can reﬂect unobserved
factors associated with both family income and sons’ earnings. In the Swedish
case, more than half of the estimated effect of family income on children’s earn-
ings can be accounted for by other parental characteristics such as class and edu-
cation (Mood 2017), so the associations we observe should be seen as capturing
effects of family background more broadly. To the extent that factors such as
parental education and social class are related to sons’ earnings net of parental
income, the income coefﬁcient underestimates overall persistence in advantage.
In Sweden, the overlap between income and social class mobility is around 50
percent (Breen, Mood, and Jonsson 2016), and using either parental income or
class in predicting sons’ earnings underestimates the impact of parental back-
ground on earnings with around 25 percent (Mood 2017). Estimating more
comprehensive models in a comparative framework, which requires larger sam-
ples than have been available to us, is a natural next step for improving our
understanding of intergenerational processes.
Discussion
How can we explain our ﬁnding that the large inter-nation differences in income
persistence primarily stem from the part that is unmediated by children’s
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education? Because the association need not reﬂect a causal effect of parental
income, we must consider a broad range of potential mechanisms. One is occu-
pational inheritance, which could lead to intergenerational similarities in income
even net of education and ability, but the available evidence suggests that the
United States is not much different from Sweden in this respect (Jonsson et al.
2009). Another strand of research has noted that the income persistence across
generations is partly based on non-cognitive characteristics (cf. Bowles, Gintis,
and Osborn Graves 2005). However, results for both Britain (Blanden, Gregg,
and Macmillan 2007) and Sweden (Mood, Jonsson, and Bihangen 2012) suggest
that such characteristics do not account for more than around 10 percent of
income persistence in sons, and could hardly explain much of the differences
across countries.
A more conventional type of explanation would focus on the use of family re-
sources for improving sons’ labor market chances via social networks, for exam-
ple by the hiring of offspring in the ﬁrm in which a parent works (Bingley,
Corak, and Westergård-Nielsen 2012). But why would such social network ef-
fects be more important in the United States and Britain than in Sweden? One
potential reason could be that public sector employment, where recruitment pro-
cesses tend to be more meritocratic (Hällsten 2013), is more common in
Sweden; another that residential and school segregation—possibly most extreme
in the United States—could provide children of disadvantaged origins with very
limited social contacts, or perhaps few inroads at all into the labor market (cf.
Wilson 1996).10
It is tempting to invoke a welfare state or general equality explanation for the
outlier position of Sweden in our results, but it is less obvious how such explana-
tions would make intelligible the crucial part of the income persistence that is
net of education and ability. Because the poor in Sweden have a high absolute
living standard in a comparative perspective (Eurostat 2016), partly because of
more generous beneﬁts in kind, it is perhaps possible that young people of disad-
vantaged background are not immediately forced into dead-end jobs to the same
extent in Sweden as in Britain and the United States, and thus that they can
maintain an income career more on par with their peers with the same educa-
tional credentials but from richer families.11
Finally, we return to the issue of inequality and “meritocratic selection.”
Some of the partial association between family income and sons’ earnings, con-
trolling for education and ability (OD.E)—often referred to as “non-merito-
cratic” or “ascriptive”—may reﬂect processes that most would see as legitimate,
such as genetic transmission of non-cognitive abilities and parent-child socializa-
tion that is not dependent on budget restrictions (Swift 2005). However, even if
not the entire intergenerational income association represents inequality as we
normally understand the concept (Roemer 1998), we believe that there is little
reason to expect such “ascriptive” factors to differ between our countries. The
United States and Britain could certainly move some distance toward the
Swedish level of ascription without intruding into family life (and probably
much further). Our results have shown that education, albeit not unimportant,
is hardly a sufﬁcient vehicle for such equalization—family circumstances, either
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in terms of income, or correlated with it, promote children’s labor market
chances in other ways too.
Notes
1. It should be said that social class mobility analyses have had other aims than study-
ing inequality of opportunity (cf. Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992), but over time it has
become more and more common to address this issue with these rather blunt tools.
2. The rank correlation functions much like the log-odds and loglinear models, which
control for the (parent-child) marginal distributions of occupations or classes in
social mobility research (e.g., Goodman 1979). We also calculated Pearson’s r, and
the results were very similar.
3. For the United States, the PSID satisﬁes (1) and (3) but not (2) with sufﬁcient sample
size; the National Longitudinal Study (NLS) 1966 fails all these criteria; for Britain,
the National Child Development Study (NCDS) fails (1).
4. These procedures are standard and of high quality; they are possible because all
Swedish registers contain the same personal identiﬁer. The matching was done by
Statistics Sweden following approval from a vetting board. All analyses were done
via Statistics Sweden’s secure micro-data online system on anonymized data.
5. Analysis of work patterns for the individuals dropped from our sample in these
countries suggests that these people spend the majority of the year out of work in the
year that earnings are reported and so are assumed to be similar to the individuals
missing from the British sample.
6. Although extensive, our educational measures do not pick up quality or status differ-
ences between schools. As the private school sector is more signiﬁcant in both the
United States and Britain, status or quality differences between schools may be more
pronounced there than in Sweden. However, results from both Britain and the
United States suggest that the ﬁeld of study (included in our models) matters far
more for earnings than attending a high-status education institution (Sullivan 2015;
Thomas and Zhang 2005).
7. To assess the robustness of this assumption for the British case, we estimated the
measurement error in male earnings for those of similar ages and cohorts as the
fathers in BCS, using the Annual Survey of Household Earnings. Assuming classical
measurement error, the elasticity using earnings at child ages 10 and 16 would be 80
percent of the one using a full childhood measure, which is supportive of using the
Swedish 81 percent for rescaling. See Gregg, Macmillan, and Vittori (2016, appen-
dix) for full details.
8. The estimated rank correlation (and also Pearson’s r) of around 0.4 for men in the
United States is very close to the ﬁgure for intergenerational occupational correla-
tions reported for white men aged 35–44 in various US datasets (Hauser et al. 2000,
table 8.5).
9. The association between parental income and child education can be affected by
measurement error in a similar way as the elasticity, meaning that the estimates in
table 4 are most likely downwardly biased (and slightly more so for the United
States, as income is averaged at 16/17 instead of 10/16). This does not pose a prob-
lem for the decomposition if the measurement errors in the income-education associ-
ation are symmetrical to the ones in the income-earnings association. Using the
Swedish data, we ﬁnd that the part of the elasticity that is mediated by education is
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slightly more biased by measurement error than the rest of the elasticity. We there-
fore carry out the decomposition as outlined in equations (3) to (5), but we adjust for
the asymmetry in measurement errors (which makes little difference to the results).
We scale up the through-education paths slightly (by around 10 percent in all coun-
tries, at the cost of the non-education path) to compensate for the estimated differ-
ence in measurement error bias. The components sum to the overall scaled elasticity
(or rank correlation).
10. A suggestion sometimes raised is that the results for the United States are due to its
purportedly more heterogeneous population in terms of “race.” After testing this, we
conclude that the race composition does not explain our cross-national differences.
In a study of racial differences in intergenerational persistence on US NLSY data,
Bloome and Western (2011, table 6) show that both the intergenerational elasticity
and the mediating function of educational attainment are almost exactly the same
for blacks and whites.
11. Studies in social mobility suggest that higher education could act as an equalizer by
dampening origin effects (Breen and Jonsson 2007; Hout 1988; Torche 2011). To
study this, we ﬁtted interactions between family origin income and respondents’ level
of education (also controlling for ability) on son’s income, but the US and British
data are too sparse to base any conclusions on. The Swedish data suggest no or little
interaction, however.
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Table A2. Summary statistics for extended measures of sons’ educational qualiﬁcation level
in the US, Britain, and Sweden for our sample of parent-son pairs
Country US Britain Sweden
Birth cohort 1957–65 1970 1965
Highest educational level/ ﬁeld of son in US/Britain /
Sweden Percent
Drop out/<O-level/comprehensive 7.2 5.5 12.0
GED/NVQ Level 1/Upper secondary dropout 2.5 13.7 2.8
HS graduate/O-level/short upper secondary 30.9 33.9 40.8
Some 2 year college/A levels /long upper secondary 10.6 8.6 17.5
Some 4 year college/tertiary no degree/tertiary no
degree
10.3 4.1
Associates/NVQ Level 4/tertiary, semi- or lower
professional
6.3 3.2 9.9
Bachelors – no ﬁeld 0.5 3.7
Bachelor ﬁeld: Law, medicine or economics 0.9 2.0 4.0
Bachelor ﬁeld: Social Science 11.5 4.6 1.8
Bachelor ﬁeld: Science 8.1 6.3 4.8
Bachelor ﬁeld: Humanities 2.0 2.0 0.5
Bachelor ﬁeld: Other 0.3 1.5 0.1
Postgraduate 3.4 6.2 1.5
Missing education data 5.8 9.0 0.1
Total 100 100 100
Number of O levels A*-C 3.1
Number of A levels 0.81
Percentile cognitive test 51.2 50.5 50.8
N 985 1,332 49,482
Notes:
1. Sources: Authors’ calculations based on NLSY79 (US), BCS70 (Britain) and Swedish
population registers, 1965 cohort. Sample weights are used in the US for the representative
cross-sectional sample.
2. For Sweden education is the highest education recorded 1990–2007. In the US and Britain,
education is the highest education recorded in 1988 and 1996 respectively.
3. Across all three sources the sample consists of those with valid observation of parental
income at two periods in childhood (16/17 US, 10/16 Britain/Sweden) and earnings at age 39/
42.
4. Excluded from the sample are observations with self-employed sons or zero parental
incomes, sons in the bottom 2% of earnings (US and Sweden) and sons in the top 2% of
earnings (US).
5. Incomes and earnings above 4 standard deviations are top-coded in Sweden.
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Table A3. Wage returns to highest extended educational level for sons in the US, Britain,
and Sweden
US Britain Sweden
Model 2: Extended education measures (US/Britain/Swe)
Drop out/<O-level/comprehensive −1.131 (.207) −0.630 (.122) −0.673 (.013)
GED/NVQ Level 1/Upper second
dropout
−1.079 (.227) −0.502 (.114) −0.774 (.017)
HS graduate/O-level/short upper
secondary
−0.917 (.197) −0.383 (.109) −0.568 (.012)
Some 2 year college/A levels /long upper
second
−0.816 (.202) −0.510 (.111) −0.356 (.012)
Some 4 year college/tertiary no degree −0.635 (.202) −0.561 (.015)
Associates/NVQ Level 4/tertiary, semi-
or lower professional
−0.754 (.207) −0.200 (.129) −0.400 (.013)
Bachelors/university qualiﬁcation/
bachelor – no ﬁeld
−0.226 (.331) −0.228 (.126)
Bachelor ﬁeld: Law, medicine or
economics
Base Base Base
Bachelor ﬁeld: Social Science −0.510 (.200) −0.061 (.119) −0.461 (.020)
Bachelor ﬁeld: Science −0.316 (.204) −0.096 (.114) −0.066 (.015)
Bachelor ﬁeld: Humanities −0.480 (.234) −0.502 (.141) −0.709 (.032)
Bachelor ﬁeld: Other −0.731 (.408) −0.350 (.151) −0.439 (.058)
Postgraduate −0.072 (.219) −0.267 (.113) −0.180 (.021)
Number of O levels A*-C 0.025 (.005)
Number of A levels 0.056 (.016)
Model 3: Including cognitive tests (US/Britain/Swe)
Drop out/<O-level/comprehensive −0.837 (.211) −0.556 (.123) −0.566 (.013)
GED/NVQ Level 1/Upper second
dropout
−0.838 (.227) −0.448 (.115) −0.697 (.017)
HS graduate/O-level/short upper
secondary
−0.703 (.197) −0.355 (.109) −0.485 (.012)
Some 2 year college/A levels /long upper
secondary
−0.685 (.200) −0.505 (.111) −0.330 (.012)
Some 4 year college/tertiary no degree −0.522 (.200) −0.537 (.015)
Associates/NVQ Level 4/tertiary,
semi- or lower professional
−0.630 (.205) −0.197 (.129) −0.366 (.013)
Bachelors/university qualiﬁcation/
bachelor – no ﬁeld
−0.201 (.326) −0.209 (.126)
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Table A3. continued
US Britain Sweden
Bachelor ﬁeld: Social Science −0.457 (.198) −0.062 (.118) −0.447 (.020)
Bachelor ﬁeld: Science −0.296 (.201) −0.088 (.113) −0.069 (.015)
Bachelor ﬁeld: Humanities −0.416 (.231) −0.507 (.140) −0.703 (.032)
Bachelor ﬁeld: Other −0.711 (.402) −0.342 (.150) −0.432 (.058)
Postgraduate −0.075 (.215) −0.278 (.113) −0.191 (.021)
Number of O levels A*-C 0.019 (.005)
Number of A levels 0.054 (.016)
Percentile cognitive test 0.501 (.090) 0.231 (.064) 0.225 (.010)
N 985 1,332 49,482
Notes:
1. Sources: Authors’ calculations based on NLSY79 (US), BCS70 (Britain) and Swedish
population registers, 1965 cohort. Sample weights are used in the US for the representative
cross-sectional sample.
2. Coefﬁcients from a regression of ln monthly earnings of sons’ at 39/42 on highest education
level dummies for sons and ln monthly average family income in childhood. Standard errors
in parentheses.
3. A missing dummy is included for missing sons’ education (not shown in table).
4. Family income averaged over age 10 and 16 in British data; 16 and 17 in US data; 10 and 16
in Swedish data.
5. Across all three sources the sample consists of those with valid observation of parental income
at two periods in childhood (16/17 US, 10/16 Britain/Sweden) and earnings at age 39/42.
6. For Sweden education is the highest education recorded 1990–2007. In the US and Britain,
education is the highest education recorded in 1988 and 1996 respectively.
7. Excluded from the sample are observations with self-employed sons or zero parental
incomes, sons in the bottom 2% of earnings (US and Sweden) and sons in the top 2% of
earnings (US).
8. Incomes and earnings above 4 standard deviations are top-coded in Sweden.
146 Social Forces 96(1)
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article-abstract/96/1/121/3885844
by University College London Library user
on 10 January 2018
Table A4. Family income gradients in extended measures of education for sons in the US,
Britain and Sweden
Educational level/ﬁeld (US/Britain/Swe) US Britain Sweden
Drop out/<O-level/comprehensive −0.092 (.015) −0.068 (.014) −0.106 (.004)
GED/NVQ Level 1/Upper second
dropout
−0.017 (.009) −0.119 (.021) −0.021 (.002)
HS graduate/O-level/short upper
secondary
−0.101 (.028) −0.046 (.030) −0.207 (.005)
Some 2 year college/A levels /long upper
secondary
−0.010 (.019) 0.035 (.018) 0.086 (.004)
Some 4 year college/tertiary no degree −0.005 (.019) 0.020 (.002)
Associates/NVQ Level 4/tertiary,
semi- or lower professional
0.028 (.015) 0.010 (.011) 0.039 (.003)
Bachelors/university qualiﬁcation/
bachelor – no ﬁeld
0.001 (.004) 0.015 (.012) 0.068 (.002)
Bachelor ﬁeld: Law, medicine or
economics
0.009 (.005) 0.025 (.009) 0.016 (.001)
Bachelor ﬁeld: Social Science 0.103 (.019) 0.052 (.013) 0.075 (.002)
Bachelor ﬁeld: Science 0.034 (.016) 0.042 (.015) 0.004 (.001)
Bachelor ﬁeld: Humanities 0.017 (.008) 0.029 (.009) 0.001 (.000)
Bachelor ﬁeld: Other 0.002 (.003) 0.023 (.007)
Postgraduate 0.030 (.011) 0.072 (.015) 0.025 (.001)
Number of O levels A*-C 2.352 (.219)
Number of A levels 0.637 (.074)
Percentile cognitive test 0.168 (.016) 0.153 (.017) 0.161 (.003)
N 985 1,332 49,482
Notes:
1. Sources: Authors’ calculations based on NLSY79 (US), BCS70 (Britain) and Swedish
population registers, 1965 cohort. Sample weights are used in the US for the representative
cross-sectional sample.
2. Income gradients from separate bivariate regressions of categorical education dummies on
family income in childhood. The base category is therefore all other education categories.
Coefﬁcients show the effects of doubling family incomes on attaining one educational
qualiﬁcation rather than any other. Standard errors in parentheses.
3. Family income averaged over age 10 and 16 in British data; 16 and 17 in US data; 10 and 16 in
Swedish data.
4. For Sweden education is the highest education recorded 1990–2007. In the US and Britain,
education is the highest education recorded in 1988 and 1996 respectively.
5. Sample restricted to those with earnings at 39/42 and parental income observed at child
ages 10 and 16 (Sweden, Britain) or 16 and 17 (US).
6. Excluded from the sample are observations with self-employed sons or zero parental incomes,
sons in the bottom 2% of earnings (US and Sweden) and sons in the top 2% of earnings (US).
7. Incomes and earnings above 4 standard deviations are top-coded in Sweden.
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